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et al.: Recent Decisions

LEGAL SHORTS

RECENT DECISIONS AFFECTING
THE MONTANA PRACTITIONER
I.

ASPEN TRAILS RANCH,

LLC

v. SIMMONS l

Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons clarified certain environmental

impact information a developer is required to include in an application to
build a subdivision. 2 The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's decision to void the Helena City Commission's approval of a subdivision application submitted by Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC ("Aspen
Trails"). 3 In doing so, the Court held that the Helena City Commission
("Commission") violated the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act
("MSPA") by approving the application without taking a "hard look" at the
negative impacts the subdivision could have on the surrounding environment. 4 The Court also upheld the district court's decision to admit evidence
outside of the administrative record to determine whether the Commission
5
properly examined the environmental impacts of the subdivision.
In August 2005, Aspen Trails filed an application with the Commission to build a large subdivision north of Helena's city limits. 6 Pursuant to

the MSPA, Aspen Trails included an environmental assessment ("EA") of
the subdivision with its application.7 The EA summarized the probable environmental impacts of the subdivision and proposed measures to mitigate
those impacts.8 The City of Helena Planning Division submitted a report
("Staff Report") recommending that the Commission approve Aspen Trails'
1.Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons, 230 P.3d 808 (Mont. 2010).
2. Id. at 820-821.
3. Id. at 810-811.
4. Id. at 820-821.
5. Id. at 820.
6. Id.at 811.
7. Aspen Trails, 230 P.3d at 811, 820.
8. Id.at 811.
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application so long as the approval incorporated several mitigation measures. 9 At a public meeting in November 2005, the Commission approved
the application. 10 Although members of the Commission voiced concern
about the subdivision's impact on flooding and groundwater in the area, the
Commission determined that the negative impacts of the subdivision would
be mitigated by adopting the Staff Report's recommended measures.' 1
Less than a month later, landowners Peter Elliot and Barry J. Simmons
("Landowners") sued the Commission in district court, challenging its approval of Aspen Trails' application. 1 2 The Landowners alleged that inadequacies in the EA prevented the Commission from fully considering the
13
environmental impacts of the subdivision as required by the MSPA.
In December 2008, the district court held a hearing to allow the Landowners and Commission to present evidence and testimony regarding the
adequacy of the EA. 14 Notably, the district court allowed the Landowners'
expert to introduce evidence not presented to the Commission prior to its
approval of the application.' 5 The Landowners argued that Aspen Trails'
EA was inadequate in four respects: (1) it failed to provide groundwater
data taken from monitor wells throughout the proposed subdivision; (2) it
failed to assess the impact of surface pollutants, such as fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides and other household materials, on the groundwater; (3) it
failed to provide site-specific flood information; and (4) it did not adequately address whether the water-saturated soil at the site would cause
problems in the event of an earthquake. 16 In response, the Commission
argued that the EA was adequate and any negative impacts of the subdivi17
sion would be sufficiently reduced by the adopted mitigation measures.
In March 2009, the district court voided the Commission's approval of
Aspen Trails' subdivision. 8 The district court noted that the MSPA required the EA to include available groundwater information and probable
impacts on the natural environment.' 9 In reviewing whether the EA pro20
vided that information, the district court adopted the "hard look" standard.
The district court explained the "hard look" standard requires a court to
determine whether an agency took:
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Aspen Trails, 230 P.3d at 812.
Id.
Id. at 812, 820.
Id. at 812-813.
Id.at 813.
Id.
Aspen Trails, 230 P.3d at 813.
Id.at 813-814.
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[a] "hard look" at the environmental impacts of a given project or proposal... The Court does not take a hard look itself but requires that the agency
does so. The Court focuses on the validity and appropriateness of the admin2
istrative decision itself without intense scrutiny of the decision itself. '

The district court agreed with the Landowners that deficiencies in the
EA prevented the Commission from taking a "hard look" at the environmental impacts of the subdivision. 2 2 First, the district court noted that
while the MSPA required that the EA provide "available groundwater information," the EA failed to include a United States Geological Service
("USGS") report on groundwater in the area and test well data taken from
wells throughout the proposed site. 2 3 Highlighting the importance of this
information, the district court pointed out that the Landowners' expert testified that a detailed study of the area's groundwater would be needed to
assess the impacts of the subdivision. 24 The district court ruled that the
EA's failure to include this information prevented the Commission from
taking a "hard look" at the impacts the subdivision could have on ground25
water quality.
Second, the district court ruled that the EA's failure to discuss surface
pollutants also prevented the Commission from taking a "hard look" at the
impacts of the subdivision. 26 The district court stated that, given the area's
high groundwater and the large size of the subdivision, the EA should have
discussed the environmental impact of surface pollution-such as herbi27
cides, pesticides, fertilizers, and other household materials.
Based on its determinations, the district court held that the Commission's approval was unlawful because the EA did not provide the "available
groundwater information" for the site, as required by the MSPA; therefore,
the Commission was unable to review this information. 28 The district court
also held that the Commission's approval was "arbitrary and capricious"
because it failed to consider the impact of surface pollution on groundwater
29
quality.
On appeal, Aspen Trails argued that the district court erred by (1) allowing the Landowners' expert to present information not part of the administrative record; (2) applying the "hard look" standard to determine
whether the Commission appropriately reviewed the environmental impacts
21.
(2008)).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 814 (citing Clark Fork Coalition v. Mont. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 197 P.3d 482, 492
Aspen Trails, 230 P.3d at 814.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 814-815.
Id. at 814.
Aspen Trails, 230 P.3d at 814.
Id.
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of the subdivision; and (3) voiding the Commission's approval of the subdivision instead of remanding the case back to the Commission so that Aspen
30
Trails could present the required information.
The Montana Supreme Court first concluded that the district court did
not err when it admitted testimony of the Landowners' expert that was not
part of the administrative record. 3 1 The Court reasoned that reviewing the
adequacy of an agency's decision requires a court to "look beyond the [administrative] record to determine what matters the agency should have considered .. .[and] whether the agency took into consideration all relevant
32
factors in reaching its decision."
Second, the Court affirmed the district court's use of Clark Fork Coalition's "hard-look" standard in reviewing the EA. 33 Applying that standard, the Court also affirmed the district court's ruling that inadequacies in
the EA prevented the Commission from taking a "hard look." 34 The Court
agreed that by failing to include the USGS report and groundwater-test-well
information, the EA did not provide the Commission with "available
groundwater information" required by the MSPA. 35 The Court also affirmed the district court's conclusion that the EA failed to address the impact of surface pollution on groundwater and nearby surface waters. 36 Finally, the Court brusquely affirmed the district court's decision to void the
subdivision plan instead of remanding the case to the Commission so that
37
Aspen Trails could provide additional information.
Justice Rice concurred with the Court's judgment but wrote a separate
opinion to argue that the district court erred when it allowed the Landowners' expert to introduce evidence not in the administrative record. 38 Citing
the United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, Montana jurisprudence,
and administrative law treatises, Justice Rice demonstrated that allowing
evidence outside the administrative record to determine the adequacy of an
agency's decision violated bedrock principles of administrative law. 39 Justice Rice warned that the violation "invites future litigants to view district
court proceedings as a means to do what should have been done at the
40
administrative agency level-develop the record."
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 819.
Id. at 820.
Id. (citing Skyline Sportsmen's Assn. v. Bd. of Land Commrs., 951 P.2d at 32).
Aspen Trails, 230 P.3d at 820.
Id. at 821.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 821-822 (Rice, J., dissenting).
Aspen Trails, 230 P.3d at 822-824.
Id. at 825 (citing Skyline, 951 P.2d at 34 (Buyske, J., dissenting)).
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The Montana practitioner should be aware of the high bar that the
Court has articulated in regards to the environmental impact information
required by the MSPA. Additionally, Montana practitioners should be
aware that the Court has explicitly held that it is appropriate for a district
court to admit evidence from outside the administrative record to determine
the adequacy of an agency's review.
-Lee

Baxter
II.

SUMMERS V. CRESTVIEW APARTMENTS

41

In Summers v. Crestview Apartments, the Montana Supreme Court
held that residential leases in Montana may not contain a provision requiring the accelerated payment of rent upon default. 42 The Court also concluded that lease agreements may not provide for the deduction of future
unpaid rent from security deposits, 4 3 and attorney-fees provisions favoring
either party are unlawful-even where they favor the non-breaching
party. 44 Landlords and tenants should be aware of this case as the inclusion
of these prohibited terms will likely invalidate a lease agreement in its entirety .45

Matthew Summers and Heidi Ames entered a one year, written lease
agreement in Missoula for an apartment at Crestview Apartments on June
29, 2006 ("Lease"). 4 6 The Lease required a security deposit and included a
provision allowing for the deduction from that deposit of all amounts owing
at termination. 47 The Lease also included a provision for the acceleration of
rental payments upon a breach by Summers, 48 and it required Summers to
49
pay attorney fees in any dispute caused by his breach.
Shortly after entering the Lease, Summers received financing to
purchase a home. 50 Summers informed Crestview and sought to terminate
the Lease. 5 1 A Crestview representative advised Summers to offer incentives for another tenant to move in to the apartment and complete the lease
term. 52 Summers advertised in the local newspaper and offered the apart41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Summers v. Crestview Apts., 236 P.3d 586 (Mont. 2010).
Id. at 591.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 588.
Summers, 236 P.3d at 588-589.
Id. at 591.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 588.
Id.
Id.
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ment for lease at the rate of $935 per month with the first month's rent
free. 5 3 Summers estimated he received between 20 and 30 responses to the
ad, and several prospective tenants viewed the apartment and were sent to
the Crestview rental office, but Summers was unable to re-rent the apart54
ment at that time.
Summers left the apartment in mid-October having paid rent through
the end of that month. 55 On November 15, Crestview issued Summers a
"Statement of Deduction from the Security Deposit," which indicated that
Summers's security deposit had been used to pay for future rent through the
end of the Lease and showed an additional amount owing of $6,505.75.56
The next day, Crestview's collection agency informed Summers that he
owed $9,758.63 for accelerated rent plus a 50% collection fee. 57 Summers's apartment was finally re-rented on June 1, 2007, with only one
58
month remaining under the Lease.
59
Crestview admitted to taking no extra effort to rent the apartment.
Crestview included Summers's apartment with its other vacant units in its
regular newspaper and online advertisements. 60 While Crestview's policy
was to offer a breached-lease apartment at the rate set in the lease, that
information was not included in Crestview's ads, which showed similar
apartments for $980 per month. 6 1 Crestview offered 26 similar apartments
and rented at least 12 of those apartments while Summers's apartment re62
mained vacant.
Summers sued Crestview for violating the Security Deposits Act by
wrongfully withholding money from his security deposit and for violating
the Montana Landlord and Tenant Act ("MLTA") due to lack of mitigating
efforts and misleading language under the Lease. 63 The Fourth Judicial
District Court, Missoula County, found in favor of Crestview and awarded
Crestview recovery of $9,442.36 with interest and costs. 6 4 Summers ap66
pealed. 65 The Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court.
53. Summers, 236 P.3d at 588.
54. Id.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Summers, 236 P.3d at 588.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 589.
Summers, 236 P.3d at 589.
Id. at 587.
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The Court held that Crestview could not legally deduct future unpaid
rent from Summers's security deposit. 67 Summers argued that withdrawing
future unpaid rent from a security deposit was prohibited by the Security
Deposits Act, Montana Code Annotated § 70-25-201(1),68 which provides
that a landlord may only deduct money owing "at the time of deduction"
from a security deposit. 6 9 Summers contended that future rent was not a
permitted charge because it was not owed at the time of deduction. 70 Crestview disagreed and argued that § 70-25-201(1) included monies owed for
any rent whether current or future, and the accelerated-rent provision transformed future rent into damages owed immediately upon breach. 7 1 The
Court agreed with Summers, concluding that money owing "at the time of
72
deduction" did not include accelerated rent.
The Court also held that accelerated-rent provisions were prohibited
because they were unconscionable under the MLTA. 73 The MLTA provides that if a court determines that a contract provision is unconscionable,
"the court may refuse to enforce the agreement or enforce the remainder of
the agreement without the unconscionable provision to avoid an unconscionable result."' 74 The Summers Court followed the traditional two-prong
analysis of unconscionability, requiring both procedural and substantive unfairness. 75 The majority concluded that the accelerated-rent provision was
unconscionable because the rental agreement was a contract of adhesion
(the agreement was prepared by Crestview without allowing Summers any
reasonable opportunity to negotiate) and it unreasonably favored Crestview.

76

The Court decided that the accelerated-rent provision unreasonably favored Crestview because it provided a disincentive for Crestview to mitigate damages, contrary to the duty imposed under § 70-24-401(1). 77 Because Crestview was able to collect the accelerated rent while simultaneously offering the apartment for rent, Crestview had no incentive to rent the
apartment quickly. 78 Additionally, while Crestview was benefitting both
from Summers's rental payments and his vacant apartment, Summers was
paying "without receiving any of the attendant benefits of possession of the
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 590.
Id.
Mont. Code Ann. § 70-25-201(l) (2005) (emphasis added).
Summers, 236 P.3d at 589.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 591.
Mont. Code. Ann. § 70-24-404(1)(a).
Summers, 236 P.3d at 590.
Id. at 590-591.
Id. at 591.
Id.
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apartment." 79 The Court consequently held that accelerated-rent provisions
effectively eliminate mitigating efforts and conflict with the MLTA and the
duty to mitigate damages.8 0 The Court held that that the provision was
procedurally unfair due to the lack of negotiating power and was substantively unfair because it removed incentives to mitigate.8 1 Accordingly, the
82
Court held the provision was unconscionable and unenforceable.
According to the Summers opinion, the MLTA also prohibits imposing
an automatic obligation on the tenant to pay a landlord's attorney fees that
are occasioned by the tenant's breach.8 3 The Lease required Summers to
pay all attorney fees caused by his breach of the contract.8 4 However, the
MLTA allows for the prevailing party in litigation to receive fees "notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary. '85 The MLTA also prohibits any
rental agreement from allowing a party "to waive or forego rights or remedies under this chapter" or "to indemnify the other party for that liability or
the costs or attorney's fees connected therewith. '8 6 Summers argued, and
the Court agreed, that language forcing a residential tenant to pay attorney
fees directly violates the MLTA because it requires tenants to forego any
right to attorney fees they may acquire as a prevailing party under the
8 7
MLTA, even in an action caused by their breach.
To protect tenants' rights and discourage landlords from including
similar accelerated-rent and attorney-fees provisions in their leases, the
Court rendered the entire Lease between Summers and Crestview unenforceable8 8 and awarded damages to Summers under § 70-24-403(2).89
The Court concluded that merely severing the provisions did not address
"the chilling effect that such provisions could continue to have on the exercise of tenants' statutory rights if the only consequence to a landlord for
using such provisions is that they are found unenforceable by a court." 90
The Court determined that Crestview should have known its provisions
were prohibited by the MLTA. 9 1 Further, § 70-24-403(2) allows for a
party to receive damages for the purposeful use of prohibited rental provi79. Id.
80. Id.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Summers, 236 P.3d at 591.
Id.
Id. at 592
Id.
Mont. Code. Ann. § 70-24-442(1).
Id. at § 70-24-202.
Summers, 236 P.3d at 592.
Id. at 592-593.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id.
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sions. 92 The Court remanded the matter to the district court to determine
93
the damages to be awarded to Summers.
The ramifications of this decision are profound, given the widespread
use of acceleration clauses in residential leases. The Court held that such
clauses are unconscionable and appear to render entire lease agreements
unenforceable by Montana courts. 94 Additionally, the Court held that landlords are precluded from deducting future unpaid rent from security deposits or imposing a contractual obligation of attorney fees in favor of a landlord on a tenant's breach. 95 Landlords and tenants alike should be aware of
Summers and its effect on lease agreements in Montana.
-David Bigger
III.

STATE

V. STRONG

96

In State v. Strong, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed Montana's
commitment to protecting an arrestee's right to receive a prompt initial appearance before a judge, as required by Montana Code Annotated
§ 46-7-101. 97 The Court concluded that in the absence of a showing of
specific prejudice, a violation of § 46-7-101 will result in a dismissal of
the charges without prejudice. 98 If the arrestee "demonstrates material
prejudice arising from the unnecessary delay in providing an initial appearance," the Court may dismiss the arrestee's charges with prejudice. 99
On the evening of March 24, 2008, Shawn David Strong was at home
with his infant son ("K.S.") while the child's mother, Teal Finneman,
worked a night shift. 0 0 That night, K.S. vomited twice.10 1 Upon returning
from work, Finneman found K.S. in pain and with bruises on his body.102
Additionally, K.S. was struggling to breathe. 10 3 K.S.'s condition declined,
and the next day, he began a week-long hospitalization. 10 4 K.S. had a severe laceration to his liver that "could only [have been] caused by severe
blunt force to the abdomen."' 1 5 Strong speculated K.S. may have "fallen
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.; see Mont. Code Ann. § 70-24-403(2).
Summers, 236 P.3d at 593.
Id. at 591; see id. at 597 (Rice, J. dissenting).
Id. at 593 (majority).
State v. Strong, 236 P.3d 580 (Mont. 2010).
Id. at 584.
Id.
Id. (citing State v. Gatlin, 219 P.3d 874 (Mont. 2009)).
Id. at 581.
Id.
Strong, 236 P.3d at 581.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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on a toy," but was vague when answering police questioning about the inci-

dent. 106
On March 28, 2011, the State charged Strong "with felony aggravated
assault by causing bodily injury to [K.S]."' 0 7 On the same day, Strong was
arrested and taken to jail.' 0 8 A month later, a public defender noticed
Strong in jail. After inquiring about Strong, he filed an appearance on
Strong's behalf. 10 9 Strong's initial appearance finally occurred on May 5,
2008.110 The district court denied his pretrial motion to dismiss for violation of Montana Code Annotated § 46-7-101. Strong was convicted of
aggravated assault and sentenced to prison."'
On appeal, Strong argued that the district court improperly denied his
motion to dismiss."12 Montana Code Annotated § 46-7-101 provides that
an arrested person "must be taken without unnecessary delay before the
nearest and most accessible judge for an initial appearance." '" 3 The judge's
duties at an initial appearance are laid out in § 46-7-102; they include informing the defendant of such rights as the right to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination. 1 4 Although the State conceded that the 42
days that passed between Strong's arrest and his initial appearance violated
15
§ 46-7-101(1), the parties disagreed on the appropriate remedy.
In its majority opinion, the Court recognized the importance of Montana Code Annotated § 46-7-101, pointing out that failure to comply with
6
it could result in a defendant being jailed for indefinite periods of time."
The Court noted that § 46-7-102-which requires the defendant be informed of important rights "without unnecessary delay"-works together
with § 46-7-101 to "ensure that a criminal prosecution begins promptly
11 7
and with a recognition of the defendant's essential rights."
Since Montana Code Annotated § 46-7-101 does not specify any
sanction for a violation of the statute, the Court reviewed prior cases for
guidance."I 8 In State v. Benbo, the Court held that the defendant was entitled to have evidence obtained during a period of unnecessary delay before
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Strong, 236 P.3d at 581.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 581-582
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-7-101(1) (2009).
Strong, 236 P.3d at 582.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the initial appearance suppressed.1 19 In State v. Rodriguez, however, the
Court asserted the sanction ordered in Benbo was not the sole remedy for a
violation of § 46-7-101 but was merely one of a number of possible reme-

dies. 120
The Strong Court emphasized that "delaying a defendant's initial appearance before a judge 'shocks' the concepts of fundamental fairness and
due process, and ...taints the fundamental fairness of all subsequent proceedings in the case."' 12 1 Accordingly, the Court determined that the sanction in Benbo was insufficient in Strong's case. 122 Because there was no
evidence or testimony to suppress in Strong's case, suppression would be a
1 23
meaningless remedy.
The Court instead relied upon the remedy provided in State v. Gat12
4
fin.
In Gatlin, the presiding judge violated Montana Code Annotated
§ 46-7-102 when he failed to inform the defendant of his right to counsel. 125 As a result, the Court vacated the conviction and dismissed the case
without prejudice.126 Although the judge in Gatlin violated Montana Code
Annotated § 46-7-102, and not § 46-7-101, the Strong Court opined that
the requirements of the two statutes are so "closely intertwined and interdependent" that it should follow Gatlin and dismiss the charges against
12 7
Strong.
The Court then analyzed whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. 12 8 Although the State provided no justification for holding
Strong "unrepresented, and without the proceedings required by law," the
Court declined to impose the "drastic remedy" of dismissal with
prejudice. 129 The Court held that unnecessary delay in providing an initial
appearance must cause material prejudice to warrant dismissal with
130
prejudice.
Strong was unable to show this level of prejudice and consequently
sought dismissal without prejudice.' 3' Although suppression was not an
adequate remedy in Strong's case, the Court reaffirmed the holding of
Benbo that evidence or a confession obtained during an unnecessary delay
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

State v. Benbo, 570 P.2d 894, 900 (Mont. 1977).
Strong, 236 P.3d at 583 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 628 P.2d 280, 284 (Mont. 1981)).
Id. (citing Gatlin, 219 P.3d at 878).
Id.
Id..
Id.
Gatlin, 219 P.3d at 877.
Id. at 879.
Strong, 236 P.3d at 583.
Id.
Id. at 584.
Id.
Id.
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may be suppressed; additionally, the Court held that the existence of such
evidence may be a factor in determining whether there was material
prejudice warranting a dismissal with prejudice. 132 The Court reversed the
judgment, sentence, and conviction in Strong's case and remanded it to the
33
district court with instructions to dismiss without prejudice.
Five justices concurred, with a special concurrence by Justice NelStrong's request for dismissal without prejudice perplexed Justice
Nelson; in Nelson's opinion, a dismissal without prejudice essentially
135
means the State goes unpunished for violating the defendant's rights.
Nelson argued that in order to provide an incentive for officials to follow
Montana Code Annotated § 46-7-101, the Court needed to "put some actual teeth in the sanction of dismissal" by making it dismissal with
son. 134

prejudice. 136
Justice Rice dissented, arguing the majority failed to follow stare decisis and thus overruled years of precedent that established suppression of all
evidence obtained during an unnecessary delay as the remedy for violating
Montana Code Annotated § 46-7-101.137 Justice Rice disagreed with the
majority's contention that under Benbo and Rodriguez, suppression of evidence is only one possible remedy. 138 He asserted this rule only applied in
cases involving juvenile offenders. 139 According to Rice, since Benbo, the
Court had "[never] mentioned dismissal as a remedy," and the new remedy
140
adopted by the majority was "unclear."'
Montana practitioners should take note of Strong and the potential
consequences for failing to follow Montana Code Annotated § 46-7-101.
An unnecessary delay in providing an initial appearance before a judge will
likely result in a dismissal of the charges without prejudice, or a dismissal
with prejudice if the defendant can show material prejudice. Only time will
tell, however, if Montana courts will strictly follow Strong, or alternatively,
will look to the remedy in Benbo and suppress all evidence obtained during
an unnecessary delay instead of applying the harsher punishment of dismissal.
-Haley Connell
132. Id.
133. Strong, 236 P.3d at 584.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. (Nelson, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 585 (Rice, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Strong, 236 P.3d at 585 (Rice, J., dissenting).
140. Id.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol72/iss2/7

12

et al.: Recent Decisions

2011
IV.

LEGAL SHORTS
STATE FARM MUTUAL

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO.

v.

FREYER 14 1

In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Freyer, the Montana Supreme Court interpreted an insurance claim for both direct and derivative damages under the particular language of the insurance policy at
issue. 14 2 The Court held that under the policy at issue, an individual who
suffers bodily injury can recover against her "Each Person" limit for deriva143
tive damages resulting from another person's bodily injury.
Heath Freyer, his wife, Vail, and their infant daughter, Alicia, were
involved in an automobile accident in October 2003 that killed Heath and
injured Alicia.144 Vail was driving when they collided with another vehicle
driven by Michelle Manning. 145 Vail lost control of the vehicle, and it
rolled, ejecting Heath. 14 6 Heath was fatally injured in the accident. 147 Ali14 8
cia was also injured and required over $2,500 in medical treatment.
Heath's father, Frank Freyer, was appointed personal representative of
Heath's estate and conservator of Alicia's estate.14 9 Frank filed a claim for
benefits under Heath's and Vail's State Farm insurance policy. 150 State
Farm paid Heath's estate $50,000, the policy limit for "Each Person," and
paid Alicia's medical expenses separately. 15 1 Frank, however, insisted that
State Farm also pay Alicia wrongful death and survivorship benefits resulting from Heath's death.1 52 Frank maintained that those "additional benefits
should be paid out of the policy's $50,000 'Each Person' limit for Alicia,"
which, "when added to the $50,000 paid to Heath's estate, exhaust the
$100,000 'Each Accident' policy limit."' 153 State Farm refused to make
these additional payments and argued it had fulfilled its contractual obliga154
tions stemming from Heath's death.
State Farm moved for partial summary judgment in May 2008; Frank
and Vail each filed countermotions for summary judgment. 155 The district
court granted State Farm's motion, holding that the policy was unambiguous and that "'[a]ny claims asserted by Alicia related to the wrongful death
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

St. Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Freyer, 239 P.3d 143 (Mont. 2010).
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id.
Freyer, 239 P.3d at 144.
Id.
Id. at 144-145.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 145.
Frever, 239 P.3d at 145.
Id.
Id.
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or survivorship of her father are restricted by his 'Each Person' policy
limit."' 56 Frank and Vail appealed.' 57
The Montana Supreme Court reviews a district court's interpretation of
a contract for "correctness." 158 The Court analyzes "insurance contracts as
a whole," giving the "usual meaning to the terms" and "[construing] them
using common sense."' 159 The Court determines whether an insurance contract is ambiguous from the "viewpoint of a[n] average consumer." An
ambiguity exists where a contract is "reasonably subject to two different
interpretations."' 160 Any ambiguities in an insurance contract are construed
16 1
in favor of the insured.
The relevant clause in Heath's policy stated:
The amount of bodily injury liability coverage is shown on the declarations
page under "Limits of Liability-Coverage A-Bodily Injury, Each Person, Each

Accident." Under "Each Person" is the amount of coverage for all damages
due to bodily injury to one person. "Bodily injury to one person" includes all

injury and damages to other persons, including emotional distress, sustained
by such other persons who do not sustain bodily injury. Under "Each Acci-

dent" is the total amount of coverage, subject to the amount shown under
"Each Person," for all damages due to bodily injury to two or more persons in
the same accident. [Emphasis in original removed.]' 6 2

Heath's policy defined "Bodily Injury" as "physical bodily injury to a
person and sickness, disease or death which results from it"163 and clarified
that "[a] person does not sustain bodily injury if they suffer emotional dis1 64
tress in the absence of physical bodily injury."'
Alicia claimed "both direct damages as a result of her bodily injury
and derivative damages arising from the loss of her father."' 165 The question was whether Alicia's derivative damages claim should be satisfied out
of her $50,000 'Each Person' policy limit or whether it should be subsumed
in Heath's 'Each Person' policy limit.' 66 Since Alicia was physically injured in the accident, the Court based its discussion not on general derivative damages jurisprudence-which addresses "damages that 'derive'
[solely] from another person's injury or wrongful death"1 67-but on the
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 145 (citing Modroo v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins., 191 P.3d 389, 395 (Mont. 2008)).
Frever. 239 P.3d at 145.
Id.
Id. (citing Modroo, 191 P.3d at 395).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Freyer, 239 P.3d at 146 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 145-146.
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language of Heath's policy.16 8 The Court implied that its decision should
1 69
not be construed to affect its previous derivative claims jurisprudence.
At issue was one sentence from the text of Heath's policy: "'Bodily
injury to one person' includes all injury and damages to other persons, including emotional distress, sustained by other persons who do not sustain
bodily injury."' 70 Frank interpreted the language to mean that, because Alicia actually suffered bodily injury in the accident, she could recover her
direct damages in addition to her derivative damages, up to the "Each Person" and "Each Accident" policy limits. 17 1 State Farm argued that Heath's
"Each Person" limit "encompassed all independent and derivative claims
arising from [his] death," including Alicia's derivative damages claim. The
Court, however, reasoned that State Farm's interpretation would "require
that it ignore the existence of the clause confining its limitation to those
claimants 'who do not sustain bodily injury' and would thus require us to
72
omit from consideration what has been inserted into the policy."
The Court discussed both the "Each Person" and the "Each Accident"
limits.' 7 3 It stated that "[t]he 'Each Person' policy explanation merely
states the maximum amount the insurer will pay for one insured's bodily
injury."' 174 According to the Court, the "Each Person" limit also applied to
"derivative claims of person 'who do not sustain bodily injury.""' 175 But
because Alicia was physically injured, her derivative damages should have
been applied to her "Each Person" limit, and not to Heath's.176 The "Each
Accident" limit "[was] the total amount of coverage, subject to the amount
shown under 'Each Person' for all damages due to bodily injury of two or
more persons in the same accident."' 77 Accordingly, if multiple people
were physically injured in the same accident, the maximum amount paid to
each injured person would be $50,000, but the total payments could not
1 78
exceed the $100,000 "Each Accident" limit.
The Court concluded that "the complete and plain language of this
Limits of Liability Clause must be interpreted to mean that because two
people suffered bodily injury, the 'Each Accident' limit of $100,000 is
available and the 'Each Person' limitation of $50,000 applies separately to
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 146.
Id. at 147.
Id. (emphasis added).
Frever, 239 P.3d at 146.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Freyer, 239 P.3d at 146.

178. Id.
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Heath's claim and to Alicia's claim." 179 Thus, because Alicia was injured,
she was eligible for up to $50,000 in direct damages and derivative dam180
ages stemming from Heath's death.
The Court opined that its interpretation gave effect to the contract as a
whole. 18' Further, the Court indicated that it viewed the disputed language
in the contract as ambiguous.18 2 Consequently, the Court held that Alicia
was entitled to coverage "[u]nder either a plain language or an ambiguous
clause analysis."1 8 3 The Court reversed the district court's grant of partial
summary judgment for State Farm and remanded the case for "issuance of a
declaratory judgment consistent with the interpretation of the policy lan18 4
guage set forth above."'
Justice Rice dissented from the Court's interpretation of the policy,
arguing that it conflicted with prior cases regarding derivative claims. 18 5
Justice Rice stated that the Court's interpretation of "'bodily injury to one
person' excludes persons who have suffered a bodily injury" and that this
interpretation was "nonsensical."' 186 Justice Rice argued that the language
of the "Each Person" limit for Heath's bodily injuries included Alicia's derivative damages. 18 7 He maintained that this interpretation was consistent
with the Court's precedent regarding derivative claims, which provides that
derivative claims are included in the "Each Person" limit of the injured
party.1 88 In sum, Justice Rice stated that the Court's approach in this case
189
relied too heavily on the "vagaries of individual policy interpretation."
The Montana practitioner should be aware of the Court's reliance in
Freyer on the language of the particular insurance policy at issue. While
the Court stressed that this decision does not change case law regarding
derivative claims, Justice Rice's dissent pointed out that this type of analysis may lead to case-by-case, or policy-by-policy decisions.
-Francesca diStefano

179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 147.
182. Id.
183. Frever, 239 P.3d at 147.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 147 (Rice, J., dissenting).
186. Id. (emphasis in original).
187. Id.
188. Id.

189. Freyer, 239 P.3d at 148 (Rice, J., dissenting).
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V.

PETERSON V. ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE CO.'

90

In Peterson v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., the Montana
Supreme Court analyzed, as a matter of first impression, the meaning of the
"reasonably clear liability" provision of Montana's Unfair Trade Practices
Act ("UTPA").' 9 1 The Court held that "liability is 'reasonably clear' when
a reasonable person, with knowledge of the relevant facts and law, would
192
conclude, for good reason, that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff."
This definition clarified the UTPA's 1 9 3 requirement that insurers must "attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of
194
claims in which liability has become reasonably clear."
In 2004, Plaintiff Lon Peterson ("Peterson") collided head-on with
Michael Lindberg ("Lindberg"), an insured of Defendant St. Paul Fire and
Marine Insurance Co. ("St. Paul"). The collision took place at a blind corner on a dirt road in Glacier County, Montana; the road lacked both a
posted speed limit and a marked centerline.19 5 Although neither driver was
ticketed by responding Montana Highway Patrol officers, Lindberg told an
officer that his cell phone had rung directly before the crash, an admission
that the accident report characterized as a contributing factor.' 9 6 Peterson
197
suffered knee and hip injuries, as well as broken ribs.
At the time of the accident, Lindberg was working for Omimex Canada Limited ("Omimex"), a company insured by St. Paul.198 St. Paul hired
an accident reconstruction expert to help investigate the claim; the expert
determined that Peterson caused the accident and that there was no conclusive liability on behalf of Lindberg.' 99 However, claiming medical bills in
excess of $68,000, Peterson sued Omimex in federal district court.2 0 0 Then
in late 2005, Peterson injured himself in a fall at home that he attributed to
his weakened condition as a result of the accident, potentially increasing St.
Paul's exposure in the lawsuit. 20 ' Peterson offered to settle for $1.8 million. 20 2 St. Paul countered with an offer of $850,000, which Peterson ac190. Peterson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 239 P.3d 904 (Mont. 2010).
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 913-914.
Id. at 913.
Mont. Code Ann. §§ 33-18-101 to 33-18-1006 (2009).
Id. at § 33-18-201(6).
Peterson, 239 P.3d at 907.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Peterson, 239 P.3d at 907.
Id.
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cepted. 20 3 In June 2007-roughly three years after the accident-the fed20 4
eral district court entered judgment against Omimex.
Two days later, Peterson filed a third-party bad faith lawsuit against St.
Paul in state district court, alleging that St. Paul violated the UTPA when it
refused to settle his claims for nearly three years. 20 5 The ensuing discovery
revealed that St. Paul's claims adjusters had determined that Lindberg was
50% liable for the accident. 20 6 Because Montana's comparative-negligence
statute 20 7 provides that a finding of 50% responsibility for the accident
made Lindberg liable as a matter of law, Peterson asserted that St. Paul
'20 8
itself had determined that its liability was "reasonably clear.
The district court denied Peterson's pretrial motion asking the court to
rule that 50% negligence on behalf of Lindberg constituted liability as a
matter of law for St. Paul, making liability "reasonably clear" under the
UTPA. 20 9 The court ruled that "reasonably clear liability" should be determined by the jury and that Peterson could not argue at trial that a 50-50
negligence split between the two drivers constituted negligence as a matter
of law. 2 10 The court also denied St. Paul's summary judgment motion arguing that liability had never been reasonably clear. 2t 1 During jury instruction
settlement, the court rejected the following instruction offered by Peterson:
"Under the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act, liability in a claim is rea'2 12
sonably clear if the defendant insured's negligence is 50% or greater.
Eventually, the jury was given the following instructions to determine
whether St. Paul's liability had been reasonably clear:
INSTRUCTION NO. 8

When liability for a car accident is reasonably clear and it is reasonably clear
that a medical expense and/or economic loss are causally related to the accident in question, an insurance company has an obligation under the Montana
Unfair Trade Practices Act to promptly pay those medical expenses and economic losses.
INSTRUCTION NO. 9
Liability need not be certain in order to be reasonably clear.
INSTRUCTION NO. 12

In order to assist you in your determination as to whether liability was reasonably clear you are instructed that:
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 907-908.
Id. at 908.
Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-702.
Peterson, 239 P.3d at 908.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 909.
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Every person is responsible for injury to the person [or property] of another,
caused by his/her negligence. Negligence is the failure to use reasonable
care. Negligence may consist of action or inaction. A person is negligent if
he/she fails to act as an ordinarily prudent person would act under the circumstances.
Negligence on the part of the plaintiff does not bar his/her recovery unless
such negligence was greater than the negligence of the defendant. However,
the total amount of damages that plaintiff would otherwise be entitled to recover will be reduced by the court in proportion to the amount of negligence
2 13
attributed to the plaintiff.

The jury subsequently returned an 8-4 verdict for St. Paul, which Peterson timely appealed. 214 St. Paul cross-appealed, contesting, inter alia,
the court's denial of its summary judgment motion. 215 One issue on appeal
was whether the jury instructions covering the issue of "reasonably clear
liability" fully and fairly informed the jury of the applicable law. 216
Peterson contended that the district court committed reversible error
when it rejected his proposed instruction. 217 He argued that multiple pieces
of evidence demonstrated that St. Paul was at least 50% liable, including
Lindberg's admission regarding the cell phone; estimations that Lindberg's
speed was too fast for the blind corner; the conclusions of St. Paul's claims
adjusters; and inconsistent accident reconstruction scenarios offered by St.
Paul's expert. 218 St. Paul argued that there had never been a finding of
negligence in the underlying action and disputed Peterson's characterization
of its claims-adjusting process. 21 9 Further, St. Paul argued that pursuant to
Giambra v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,220 liability was not "reasonably clear"
when genuine issues of material fact existed regarding negligence and liability, and that the reasonableness of St. Paul's handling of this determina221
tion was a question of fact for the jury.
In its decision, the Montana Supreme Court first noted that the jury's
job was not to determine who was responsible for the accident, but rather
whether St. Paul violated the UTPA in handling Peterson's claim. 222 Further, the Court found that Giambra was inapplicable because it dealt solely
with whether genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment
213. Id.
214. Peterson, 239 P.3d at 909.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 910.
218. Id.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 911.
Giambra v. Travelers Indemnit , Co., 78 P.3d 880 (Mont. 2003).
Peterson, 239 P.3d at 911.
1d.
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on the question of whether liability for an accident was reasonably clear. 2 23
The Court reasoned that while the issues in a UTPA bad faith claim are
separate from those in the underlying claim, there was "an intimate connection between the facts of the underlying accident and the decisions made by
St. Paul in the handling of the claim." 224 The Court acknowledged that
Montana cases addressed reasonably clear liability in the UTPA context,
but concluded that "our caselaw has heretofore not provided a legal definition of 'reasonably clear liability' in a manner applicable to the present
2 25
circumstances."
The Court then looked to the Massachusetts Appeals Court case
Demeo v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 2 2 6 for the holding
that "reasonably clear liability" is an "objective test [which] calls upon the
fact finder to determine whether a reasonable person, with knowledge of the
relevant facts and law, would probably have concluded, for good reason,
that the insurer was liable to the plaintiff. '2 27 The Court noted that the
Demeo standard had been subsequently adopted by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in a case with facts similar to the present appeal. 228
As such, the Court expressly adopted the Demeo objective test: "liability is
established when it is 'clear enough' that reasonable people assessing the
claim would agree on the issue of liability, and that the facts, circumstances,
and applicable law leave little room for objectively reasonable debate about
22 9
whether liability exists."
Turning to the district court's jury instructions, the Court determined
that "without another instruction defining 'reasonably clear liability' and
focusing the jury on an objective evaluation of the reasonableness of St.
Paul's conduct, we simply cannot conclude that the jury was fully and fairly
informed of the applicable law."'230 Remarking that the definition of "reasonably clear liability" was the "linchpin of Peterson's entire case," the
Court concluded that "[t]his question is so fundamental to a case of this
nature that without an instruction patterned on this legal standard a jury is
simply not in a position to make its determination on the ultimate question
of law . . ."231 As such, the Court reversed and remanded the decision,
223. Id. at 911 n 2.
224. Id. at 911 (quoting Grafv. Contl. W. Ins. Co., 89 P.3d 22, 25-26 (Mont. 2004) (internal citations omitted)).
225. Peterson, 239 P.3d at 911-912.
226. Demeo v. St. Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 649 N.E.2d 803 (Mass. App. 1995).
227. Peterson, 239 P.3d at 912 (quoting Demeo, 649 N.E.2d at 804).
228. Id. at 912-913 (citing Jackson v. St. Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 600 S.E.2d 346, 352-353
(W. Va. 2004)).
229. Id. at 913-914.
230. Id. at 914.
231. Id.
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providing the following jury instruction for determining whether liability is
reasonably clear:
You must decide whether [the insurance company] engaged in an unfair trade
practice by not making a good faith attempt to bring about a prompt, fair, and
equitable settlement of a claim in which liability was reasonably clear.
To determine if liability was reasonably clear, you must decide whether a
reasonable person, with knowledge of the relevant facts and law, would have
concluded for good reason that [defendant] was liable to [plaintiff]. In doing
so, you should take into account that, under Montana law, if [defendant] was
50% or more negligent, then [plaintiff] would be entitled to recover damages
from [defendant], even if [plaintiff] was partially negligent.
So, you must determine in this case whether a person, with knowledge of the
relevant facts and law, would have concluded for good reason that [defendant] was 50% or more negligent. 232
In sum, the Court held that when a jury is required to determine the
reasonableness of an insurer's settlement attempts when the insured's liability is reasonably clear, the jury must now review the facts from the underlying lawsuit to determine whether an objectively reasonable person would
agree that the insured was at least 50% negligent. Given the long line of
authority interpreting the UTPA's "reasonably clear liability" standard, 233
Montana practitioners working in insurance bad-faith litigation can expect
to use the jury instruction offered by the Court in this case rather frequently.

Additionally, insurance companies and attorneys working on their behalf
should keep this new standard in mind during settlement negotiations.
-Nick

Domitrovich
VI.

HULSTINE V. LENNOX

2 34

In the 2010 case Hulstine v. Lennox, the Montana Supreme Court clarified how a jury award will be affected by a joint tortfeasor's pretrial settlement in a case involving claims of both strict liability and negligence. The
Court unanimously held that a jury award should not be reduced by the
percentage of liability the jury attributed to the settling tortfeasor, but the
award should be offset by the amount of the settlement. 235
The plaintiffs were 20 young men who had been exposed to carbon
monoxide in August 2004 from a ruptured heating vent in their Job Corps
living quarters in Anaconda, Montana. 236 Lennox, Inc. ("Lennox") manu232. Id. at 915.
233. See e.g. Dubray v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 36 P.3d 897 (Mont. 2001); Ridley v. Guar. Natl. Ins.
Co., 951 P.2d 987 (Mont. 1997).
234. Hulstine v. Lennox, 237 P.3d 1277 (Mont. 2010).
235. Id. at 1282.
236. Appellants' Opening Br. at 8, Hulstine, 237 P.3d 1277.
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factured the heating unit, and Anderson's Heating and Air Conditioning,
Inc. ("Anderson's") installed it.23 7 The plaintiffs sued Lennox under theories of strict liability and negligence and Anderson's under a negligence
theory.238 The plaintiffs suffered a variety of injuries related to carbon
monoxide inhalation, and 18 of them were immediately flown to hospitals
239
around the Northwest for treatment.
240
Anderson's settled with the plaintiffs prior to trial for $2 million.
The plaintiffs and Lennox went to trial in March 2009 and the jury awarded
the plaintiffs damages of $7,490,000.241 The special verdict form required
the jury to apportion liability between Lennox and Anderson's, and the jury
allocated 70% of the liability to Lennox and 30% to Anderson's. 242 However, the jury form did not call for liability to be apportioned between the
24 3
strict liability and negligence claims.
In district court, Lennox argued that the judgment should be reduced
by 30% to reflect the jury's allocation of liability to Anderson's. 2 44 Lennox
relied on Montana Code Annotated § 27-1-703(6)(d), which states in relevant part: "A release of settlement entered into by a claimant constitutes an
assumption of the liability, if any, allocated to the settled or released person .... " 245 Lennox argued that by settling with Anderson's, the plaintiffs
had assumed Anderson's share of liability, and the award should be ad24 6
justed accordingly.
The district court reduced the award against Lennox by 30% pursuant
to § 27-1-703 and entered judgment for $5,243,000.247 The plaintiffs
moved to amend the ruling, asserting that the district court erred in reducing
the award because § 27-1-703 is limited to negligence liability, but here
the damages had been awarded for some combination of negligence and
strict products liability. 24 8 The plaintiffs argued that the reduction contradicted the plain language of the statute 249 and would compromise the public
policy underlying strict products liability-to encourage manufacturers to
250
ensure their products are safe.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Hulstine, 237 P.3d at 1279.
Id. at 1278.
Appellants' Opening Br. at 9.
Hulstine, 237 P.3d at 1279.
Appellants' Opening Br. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-703(6)(d) (2009).
Hulstine, 237 P.3d at 1279.
Id.
Id.
Pl.'s Mot. to Alter & Amend Judm. & Supporting Memo., 2009 WL 4053843 (Mont. Dist.).
Id.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol72/iss2/7

22

et al.: Recent Decisions

2011

LEGAL SHORTS

359

The plaintiffs also argued that the award against Lennox should not be
reduced dollar-for-dollar, or pro tanto, by the $2 million settlement with
Anderson's. 2 5' The plaintiffs asserted that the Montana Supreme Court had
already established that the "dollar credit rule" arose from § 27-1-703(2)
and again argued that the provision is limited to negligence and inapplicable
25 2
to damages awarded for strict liability.
After the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend, the
plaintiffs appealed to the Montana Supreme Court on the same grounds. 253
Lennox countered that the 30% reduction under § 27-1-703 was appropriate because the damages were based, at least in part, on negligence, and
25 4
alternatively, that a pro tanto reduction was appropriate.
Quoting Durden v. Hydro Flame Corp.,25 5 the Court agreed with the
plaintiffs that § 27-1-703 "is by its terms limited to negligence actions and
does not mention actions in strict liability." 256 Moreover, the Court noted
that the legislative intent is clear because the Legislature had twice considered and rejected the inclusion of strict products liability in § 27-1-703.257
Because the special verdict form did not ask the jury to apportion liability between negligence and products liability, the Court said it could not
be certain how much of the jury's award was based on negligence or even if
the jury believed Lennox was negligent at all. 258 Therefore, the Court determined that application of § 27-1-703 was inappropriate and reversed the
district court's decision to reduce the award under the comparative negli259
gence provision.
However, the Court held that the award should have been offset pro
tanto by the appellants' settlement with Anderson's. 2 60 The Court cited
Boyken v. Steele,2 6' which provides that "[w]hen a joint tortfeasor settles
with a claimant, the claimant's recovery against the remaining tortfeasor is
to be reduced dollar-for-dollar by the consideration paid by the settling
tortfeasor." 2 62 This rule is premised on the idea that where there is jointand-several liability, the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages only
once.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

26 3

Id.
Id.
Hulstine, 237 P.3d at 1279.
Id.
Durden v. Hydro Flame Corp., 983 P.2d 943 (Mont. 1999).
Hulstine, 237 P.3d at 1280.
Id. at 1280-1281.
Id. at 1281.
Id.
Id.
Boyken v. Steele, 847 P.2d 282 (Mont. 1993).
Hulstine, 237 P.3d at 1281 (citing Boyken, 847 P.2d at 284).
Id. at 1281 (citing Azure v. Cit, of Billings, 596 P.2d 460, 468 (Mont. 1979)).
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The Court rejected the appellants' argument that the pro tanto reduction was limited to negligence cases. 264 Rather, the Court stated that when
considering such an offset, "the focus of the inquiry is not whether defendants are liable under different theories[;] . .. [t]he focus of our inquiry is
whether two joint and severally liable defendants caused a single injury." 265
The Court concluded that pro tanto reductions ensure "a single satisfaction
26 6
for a single injury."
Hulstine indicates the Court's unwillingness to reduce damages under
§ 27-1-703 unless it is clear that no part of the award is for strict products
liability. The case also suggests that the Court would offset the damages by
a third-party settlement even in the absence of a special verdict form.
The Hulstine decision did not discuss what would happen if the parties
sought a verdict form that asks the jury to apportion both negligence and
bases for damages. However, in reversing the 30% reduction, the Hulstine
Court noted that it could not "discern which portion of the amount [of damages], if any, was awarded for negligence and which portion was awarded
for strict liability. '2 67 On this basis, the Court determined a percentage reduction of the award for negligence under § 27-1-703 was impossible and
constituted reversible error. 268 Theoretically, a court could instruct the jury
to specify what portion of damages, if any, it was awarding for negligence,
thereby instituting a reduction under § 27-1-703 for the amount apportioned to another party for negligence.
-Zach Franz
VII.

STATE V. ST. DENNIS

269

In State v. St. Dennis, the Montana Supreme Court determined that
potential conflicts of interest in the Montana Office of the Public Defender
2 70
("OPD") should be examined on a case-by-case basis.
Anthony St. Dennis was one of two co-defendants charged with murder. 2 7 1 On the night of December 6, 2007, St. Dennis and Dustin Strahan
had been drinking heavily in Missoula, Montana. 272 The two men
wandered towards the California Street Bridge where they noticed a home264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Boyken, 847 P.2d at 284).
Id.
Hulstine, 273 P.3d at 1281.
State v. St. Dennis, 244 P.3d 292 (Mont. 2010).
Id. at 298.
Id. at 293-294.
Id. at 294.
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less man, later identified as 56-year-old Forrest Clayton Salcido. 2 73 St.
Dennis, an 18-year-old who stood 6 foot 2 inches and weighed 200 pounds,
approached Salcido, who was 5 foot 4 inches tall and weighed 113
pounds. 274 St. Dennis instigated a fight with Salcido, and Strahan joined
the attack. 27 5 Salcido fought back but was overcome and knocked to the
ground. 2 76 According to Strahan, St. Dennis stomped on Salcido's head at
least ten times. 2 77 Strahan, unable to pull St. Dennis away, turned to leave,
at which point St. Dennis joined him. 27 8 The two men fled the scene, leaving Salcido on the ground. 279 Officers later found Salcido, who was severely beaten and unresponsive. 280 Emergency medical personnel arrived
shortly thereafter and confirmed that Salcido was dead. 2 8 1 Later that day,
Strahan's mother notified the police that her son had information regarding
the incident. 28 2 During a police interview, Strahan confessed to his role in
28 3
the attack and implicated St. Dennis.
Both St. Dennis and Strahan were charged with deliberate homicide
and, in the alternative, accountability for deliberate homicide. 2 84 The court
appointed St. Dennis two defense attorneys out of Region 2, both from the
OPD's Missoula office. 285 The court appointed Strahan two defense attorneys from Region 1: one from the OPD's Kalispell office, and one from the
OPD's Polson office. 286 At a scheduling conference in February 2008, the
district court raised the issue that both St. Dennis and Strahan were being
represented by the OPD and questioned whether it created a conflict of
2 87
interest.
At a later status conference, State Regional Public Defender Ed
Sheehy and State Chief Public Defender Randi Hood assured the court that
the OPD's procedure would not create a conflict. 28 8 The court ordered
Sheehy to file a memorandum on the issue. 2 89 Sheehy did so, and the court
concluded that the OPD could continue to represent both co-defendants
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id. at 293-294.
Id. at 294.
St. Dennis, 244 P.3d at 294.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 293.
St. Dennis, 244 P.3d at 293.
Id.
Id. at 293-294.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 296.
Id.
St. Dennis, 244 P.3d at 294.
Id.
Id.
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since it had procedural safeguards to protect against conflicts.2 90 At St.
Dennis's trial, Strahan testified against St. Dennis, and the jury found him
guilty of deliberate homicide. 29 1 The court sentenced St. Dennis to 100
years in prison and ruled that he was not eligible for parole for 40 years. 292
Strahan was sentenced to 30 years in prison with 25 suspended. 2 93 On appeal, St. Dennis argued, inter alia, that the OPD's representation of himself
294
and Strahan violated his constitutional right to counsel.
In determining whether the OPD violated St. Dennis's constitutional
right to counsel by representing the co-defendants, the Montana Supreme
Court first considered whether it would review a conflict of interest case
involving the OPD under a per se rule or apply a case-by-case approach. 295
If the per se rule applied, the remedy for a conflict of interest would be
automatic reversal. 29 6 By contrast, if the case-by-case approach applied,
the verdict would be reversed only if the defendant could demonstrate that
his attorney's performance was adversely affected by the conflict of interest.

29 7

The Court looked to several factors, including the unique nature and
role of public defender offices. 29 8 Public defenders, unlike private law
firms, are nonprofit public agencies with a single source of clients. 299 Public defenders are salaried government employees whose compensation is
not directly affected by their legal representation of clients. 30 0 Thus, public
defenders typically do not possess any motivation to favor one client over
another. 30 ' Another important factor the Court considered was the financial
burden of paying outside counsel every time a potential conflict arises between co-defendants and their OPD counsel. 30 2 The Court concluded that
the best approach for analyzing potential conflicts within the OPD is the
30 3
case-by-case approach.
Next, the Court considered whether an actual conflict of interest existed when the OPD represented both St. Dennis and Strahan. 30 4 The Court
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id.
Id. at 295.
Id.
St. Dennis, 244 P.3d at 297.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 297.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 297-298.
St. Dennis, 244 P.3d at 297-298.
Id. at 298.
Id. (citing Bolin v. Wyo., 137 P.3d 136, 145 (Wyo. 2006)).
Id. (citing Asch v. Wvo., 62 P.3d 945, 953 (Wyo. 2003)).
Id. at 298.
Id.
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examined People v. Christian,30 5 in which a California court of appeals
ruled that no conflict of interest existed where co-defendants were represented by appointed attorneys who were jointly supervised but did not share
files, office space, or confidential information. 30 6 In addition, there was no
evidence in Christian that the "ethical walls" had been ineffective in
preventing a conflict of interest from occurring. 30 7 The Montana Supreme

Court compared Montana's OPD office to the California public defender
system at issue in Christian and recognized that several of the safeguards
present in Christian-such as separate offices, computers, staff, and
phones-were also present in the Montana OPD. 30 8
The Montana Supreme Court found that no actual conflict of interest
existed in the OPD's representation of St. Dennis and Strahan. 30 9 The
Court recognized that "no system is fool-proof." 310 However, the Court
stated there was no evidence in St. Dennis's case that the OPD's safeguards
failed to prevent a conflict of interest. 31' Thus, the Court concluded that
"given the current strong precautions and safeguards, including ethical
walls, in place at OPD, dual representation of co-defendants by attorneys in
different offices has not created an actual conflict of interest." 312
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Nelson called the majority's characterization of the two OPD regional offices as separate law firms an "artificial
distinction. ' 313 He stated that "simply designating regional public defender
offices as separate 'firms' does not make it so." 314 Justice Nelson noted
that both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as
Article II, § 24 of the Montana Constitution guarantee an individual effective legal representation in all criminal prosecutions. 315 Additionally, Justice Nelson pointed out that the Sixth Amendment also imposes the duty to
3 16
avoid conflicts of interest.
Justice Nelson focused on two United States Supreme Court cases. In
Strickland v. Washington,31 7 the Supreme Court noted that in certain in318
stances, prejudice is presumed in a case involving a conflict of interest.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

People v. Christian, 41 Cal. App. 4th 986 (Cal. App. 1996).
St. Dennis, 244 P.3d at 299.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
St. Dennis, 244 P.3d at 299.
Id. at 302 (Nelson J., dissenting).
Id. at 303.
Id.
Id.
Strickland v. Wash., 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
St. Dennis, 244 P.3d at 303 (Nelson J., dissenting) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692).
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This presumption arises because it is difficult to measure the effect of the
representation where a conflict of interest might exist. 31 9 In Holloway v.
Arkansas,320 a case involving the joint representation of co-defendants, the
Supreme Court again noted that in certain cases involving a conflict of interest, it is difficult to accurately determine the impact of the conflict on the
32 1
attorney's representation.
Furthermore, Justice Nelson articulated that the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct support the contention that an attorney may not represent
a client if the representation would create a conflict of interest. 3 22 Rule
1.7(a) provides that a conflict of interest exists if "the representation of one
client will be directly adverse to another client, or there is a significant risk
that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client ... "323 Justice Nelson argued that even though each regional office of the OPD is considered an
independent law firm, the majority failed to recognize that the offices are
not actually independent of each other. 32 4 Justice Nelson claimed this was
demonstrated by the fact that Regional Deputy Public Defender Sheehy exercised authority and supervisory control over both the attorneys represent32 5
ing St. Dennis and Strahan.
In addition, Justice Nelson noted that the advisory letters exchanged
between Sheehy and one of Strahan's attorneys further evidenced Sheehy's
authority over the attorneys. 326 Although the majority refused to consider
the letters since they were not part of the record on appeal, Justice Nelson
opined that the case should be remanded to reconsider the conflict of interest and to allow the district court to review them since they demonstrated a
conflict. 3 27 Justice Nelson stated that while the public defender system may
have the best of intentions, the current system contains flaws that prevent it
from providing effective representation to co-defendants with adverse interests.

32 8

The Montana practitioner should take note that when a defendant seeks
reversal based on a conflict of interest within the OPD, the Montana Supreme Court will apply the case-by-case approach. Under this approach, a
319. Id.
320. Holloway v. Ark., 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
321. St. Dennis, 244 P.3d at 303 (Nelson J.,dissenting) (citing Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490-91).
322. Id.
323. Mont. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(a) (2010).
324. St. Dennis, 244 P.3d at 303 (Nelson J., dissenting).
325. Id. at 303-304.
326. id. at 304.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 306.
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defendant must show his attorney's performance was adversely affected by
the conflict.
-Katharine Leque
VIII.

GRIFFITH V. BUTTE SCHOOL DIsTRICT

No. 1329

The Montana Supreme Court recently held that a public school district
unconstitutionally violated a student's right to free speech by denying her
the opportunity to deliver a valedictorian speech that included references to
her religious beliefs. 330 The Court held that the student's claims were not
barred by the exclusivity provision in the Montana Human Rights Act
("MHRA"). 331 Justice Cotter wrote the majority opinion.
Griffith was one of several valedictorians in the class of 2008 at Butte
High School, a public school in Butte School District No. 1 ("School District"). 332 Griffith, along with other co-valedictorians, accepted an invitation to deliver a speech at the school's graduation ceremony on May 29,
2008. 333 Due to the large number of speakers, the valedictorians were
paired up and were to deliver their speeches in alternating fashion. 334 Griffith and her partner chose to talk about what they had learned throughout
high school. 335 Griffith intended to include three religious references in her
remarks, including the following:
I learned to persevere these past four years, even through failure or discouragement, when I had to stand for my convictions..
. I didn't let fear keep
me from sharing Christ and His joy with those around me .... Ilearned not
to be known for my grades or for what I did during school, but for being
committed to my faith and morals and being someone who lived with a pur336
pose from God with a passionate love for Him.

Despite a School District policy prohibiting the school administration
from censoring any commencement speech, the superintendent informed
Griffith that her speech was unacceptable because of the religious references. 337 On May 28, 2008, one day before the graduation ceremony, the
superintendent called Griffith into his office to suggest revisions to her ad329. Griffith v. Butte Sch. Dist. No. 1, 244 P.3d 321 (Mont. 2010).
330. Id. at 336-337.
331. Griffith, 244 P.3d at 331.
332. Id. at 325.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 326.
337. Griffith, 244 P. 3d at 326. The School District claimed that its practice was to follow School
District Policy No. 2332, which provides: "The District sponsors and pays for graduation ceremonies
and retains ultimate control over their structure and content." Conversely, the School District claimed
that it did not follow Policy No. 2333, which prohibits the censorship of student speech and provides
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dress. 338 The superintendent recommended replacing all references to God
and Christ with references to Griffith's "faith. ' 339 Griffith rejected the superintendent's edits. 340 At graduation practice, the school principal told
Griffith that she could not deliver her address if she refused to omit the
religious references. 341 Once again, Griffith refused to change her remarks. 34 2 Consequently, Griffith was not allowed to speak at the gradua343
tion ceremony.
On July 23, 2008, Griffith filed a complaint with the Montana Human
Rights Bureau ("MHRB"). 344 Griffith alleged that the superintendent, the
principal, and the School District had violated the MHRA by discriminating
against her based on her religion. 34 5 After an informal investigation, the
MHRB dismissed Griffith's complaint. 34 6 Griffith received a letter from
the MHRB on January 20, 2009, notifying her that her claim had been dis34 7
missed and that she had the right to initiate a civil action.
After receiving the notice, Griffith filed a timely complaint in the Thirteenth Judicial District. 34 8 Her complaint in district court alleged that the
School District violated the MHRA, the Montana Constitution, and the
United States Constitution. 349 After both sides filed motions for summary
350
judgment, the district court ruled in favor of the School District.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court considered two issues: first,
whether the district court properly held that three of Griffith's six counts
were barred by the exclusivity provision contained within the MHRA; and
second, whether the district court erred in holding that the School District
351
had not violated Griffith's First Amendment rights.
Addressing the first issue, the Court held that the district court erroneously relied on Saucier v. McDonald's Restaurant of Montana, Inc. 3 52 to
conclude that some of Griffith's claims were barred by the exclusivity prothat the Board "'recognizes the rights of individuals to have the freedom to express their individual
political, social or religious views, for this is the essence of education."
338. Id. at 327.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Griffith, 244 P.3d at 327.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Griffith, 244 P.3d at 327.
350. Id. at 327-328.
351. Id. at 325.
352. Saucier v. McDonald's Rest. of Mont., Inc., 179 P.3d 481 (Mont. 2008).
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vision in the MHRA. 353 The Saucier Court held that the MHRA provides
the exclusive remedy for complainants when the gravamen of a complaint
sounds in discrimination. 354 However, in Saucier, the Court interpreted the
2001 version of the MHRA, whereas Griffith's complaint required interpretation of the 2007 version of the MHRA. 355 In 2007, the Montana Legislature made significant changes to the MHRA that were meant to clarify
when the exclusivity provision of the MHRA barred civil actions. 356
After reviewing the relevant 2007 amendments to the MHRA, the
Court concluded that the plain language of the statutes gives a complainant
the option of commencing a civil action after receiving a notice of dismissal
from the MHRB. 357 Thus, the 2007 Amendments rendered the Saucier gravamen analysis unnecessary in situations such as Griffith's, when a complaint is first filed with the MHRB and subsequently dismissed. 358 Accordingly, the Court held that Griffith's claims were not barred by the exclusivity provision in the MHRA because Griffith had received notice of
359
dismissal from the MHRB before initiating her civil action.
Next, the Court considered whether the School District had violated
Griffith's First Amendment right to free speech. 360 Following Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District,36 1 the Court held that

school officials generally cannot impose viewpoint-based limitations on
student speech in a school setting. 362 However, the Court noted that there
are three recognized exceptions. 363 First, school officials can establish

viewpoint-based limitations if they reasonably believe the speech will "ma3 64
terially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school."
Second, viewpoint-based limitations are permissible if the student's expression could reasonably be perceived as bearing the school's imprimatur. 365
Third, a school may set viewpoint-based limitations if the expression ap366
pears to promote illegal drug use.
353. Griffith, 244 P.3d at 329.
354. Saucier, 179 P.3d at 498.
355. Griffith, 244 P.3d at 329.
356.
357.
358.
ble if a

Id.
Id. at 329-331.
Id. at 331. The Court cautioned, however, that the Sauciergravamen analysis may be applicacomplaint is not filed with the MHRB before initiating a civil action.

359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
362. Griffith, 244 P.3d at 333.

363. Id.
364. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
365. Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988)).
366. Id. (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007)).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2011

31

Montana Law Review, Vol. 72 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 7

368

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72

After the Court established the analytical framework, it concluded that
the School District's actions did not fit within any of the three recognized
exceptions and thus violated Griffith's right to free speech. 367 The only
exception the Court analyzed in depth was whether Griffith's religious references could reasonably be perceived to bear the school's imprimatur. 368
Relying on Cole v. Oroville Union High School District,3 69 the School
District argued that it was justified in requiring Griffith to omit the religious
references in her speech because the School District sponsored and controlled the graduation ceremony. 370 The School District argued that it cen37 1
sored Griffith to avoid violating the Establishment Clause.
The Court did not find the School District's argument persuasive, finding Cole to be factually distinguishable. 372 While Griffith planned to preface all of her references to God or Christ with "I learned," or "my faith,"
the students in Cole planned to make sectarian, proselytizing remarks in an
373
attempt to coerce those in the audience.
The Court also found the School District's argument unpersuasive because the School District printed a disclaimer in all of the graduation programs. The disclaimer disassociated the School District from the students'
remarks by explicitly providing that any remarks were not necessarily the
positions of the School District and that it did not endorse any student's
religious expression. 374 Given the nature of the remarks Griffith intended
to deliver and the disclaimer printed in the graduation program, the Court
held that those in attendance could not reasonably perceive Griffith's relig37 5
ious references as being endorsed by the School District.
Finally, the Court held that the District did not violate Griffith's state
and federal constitutional rights to free exercise of religion. 37 6 Applying
the Thomas Test, the Court held that Griffith's free exercise rights had not
been violated because she failed to show that her religious beliefs required
her to include religious expression in her speech or prohibited her from
delivering a speech without religious expression. 377 The Thomas Test requires a plaintiff to first show that the plaintiff has been denied an important
benefit. 378 If the first prong is satisfied, the plaintiff must then show that
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

Id.
Griffith, 244 P.3d at 333.
Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist, 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000).
Griffith, 244 P.3d at 333.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 333-334.
ld. at 334.
Id.
Griffith, 244 P.3d at 335.
Id. at 336.
Id. (citing Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-718 (1981)).
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the important benefit was denied because of conduct mandated or pro3 79
scribed by the plaintiff's religious beliefs.
Here, the Court held that Griffith was denied an important benefit, the
opportunity to deliver a valedictory speech, but not because of conduct proscribed or mandated by her religion. 3 80 Griffith's free exercise claim failed
because she failed to show that her religion required her to choose between
delivering a valedictory speech with religious expression and not delivering
381
a speech at all.
Griffith is the first case in which the Court has had the opportunity to
interpret the MHRA since the 2007 legislative session. The Court made
clear that a person may seek relief in district court after a proper complaint
has been filed and dismissed by the MHRB. Additionally, this case demonstrates how the Court will analyze student-speech cases in light of relevant
precedent from the United States Supreme Court. Griffith provides guidance to Montana school districts when encountering the difficult task of
ensuring that students are not denied their freedom of speech while also
making sure that the school district does not endorse religious views. While
this holding is limited to the facts, it provides direction on how to avoid
situations that many school districts must negotiate each year at graduation.
-Seamus Molloy
IX.

STATE V. ANDREWS

382

In State v. Andrews, the Montana Supreme Court established a high
threshold for withdrawing a plea under Montana Code Annotated
§ 46-16-105(2), which requires "good cause" for a change in plea. 383 The
Court held that subsequent changes in the law that broaden the rights that a
defendant waived in a plea agreement, will not establish "good cause" for
38 4
withdrawing a plea-even if the defendant is still awaiting sentencing.
In March 2007, the Northwest Drug Task Force ("Task Force") was
using an informant to investigate suspected drug transactions. 385 On March
11, Judy Harlow contacted the informant to let him know that she had drugs
to sell at her home. 38 6 She said he could buy the drugs from the Defendant,
Daniel Andrews, who was staying with her. 387 The informant met Andrews
379. Id. (citing Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-718).
380. Id.

381. Id.
382. State v. Andrews, 236 P.3d 574 (Mont. 2010).
383. Id. at 576-577.

384. Id.
385. Id. at 575.
386. Id.
387. Id.
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at Harlow's house and handed Andrews money for methamphetamine. 388
Andrews left with the money and returned 20 minutes later with Sonya
Bullcalf. 389 Andrews gave the informant a bag of powder and gave Bullcalf
the informant's money. 390 After leaving Harlow's residence, the informant
described the drug transaction to a Task Force agent and handed over the
39
bag of powder.

1

Prior to the informant's interaction with Andrews, Task Force agents
placed a "hidden transmitter" on the informant. 392 However, they lacked a
search warrant for the electronic surveillance. 393 Later, they obtained a
search warrant to search Harlow's residence. 394 Andrews's room contained
a "spoon with oxycodone residue," which Andrews admitted to owning. 395
396
He also acknowledged he used methadone.
On October 2, 2007, Andrews was charged with criminal distribution
of dangerous drugs and criminal possession of dangerous drugs. 397 However, on July 3, 2008, the State dismissed the possession charge when An398
drews entered into an Acknowledgement of Rights and Plea Agreement.
He entered an Alford plea for felony criminal possession with intent to dis39 9
tribute.
Andrews acknowledged that the facts in the affidavit in support of the
motion for leave to file the information were accurate. 400 He further agreed
with the State's recommendation "that he be committed to the Department
of Correction for seven years with five suspended. ' 40 1 Andrews's plea
agreement was thorough. 40 2 It established that Andrews had a chance to
view the charges against him, examine the investigative file, and consult his
attorney. 40 3 Further, the agreement stated that Andrews understood and
waived his "right to object to and to move to suppress any evidence that
may have been obtained in violation of the law and constitution. " 4 04 An388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

Andrews, 236 P.3d at 575.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Andrews, 236 P.3d at 575.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Andrews, 236 P.3d at 575.

401. Id.

402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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drews signed the agreement voluntarily and with full knowledge of its terms
40 5
and conditions.
At a hearing, the district court reviewed the rights Andrews would be
waiving. 40 6 Andrews testified that both he and his attorney looked over all
the evidence against him and that the plea agreement represented his best
interests. 40 7 Andrews knew the State's evidence would be enough to
"prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 408 After a thorough review of
the plea and Andrews's situation, the district court accepted the plea. 4° 9
Meanwhile, the Montana Supreme Court decided State v. Goetz4 10 on
August 20, 2008.411 At that time, Andrews had entered his plea, but he had
not yet been sentenced. 412 In Goetz, the Court held that "electronic monitoring and recording of defendant's conversations in his home with an informant constitute a search subject to the warrant requirement of the Mon'413
tana Constitution, despite consent of the informant.
4 14
On October 21, 2008, Andrews moved to withdraw his Alford plea.
The district court held a hearing in response to Andrews's motion. 415 Andrews argued that if Goetz had been decided before his Alford plea, the
results of the electronic monitoring would have been suppressed, he would
not have entered a plea agreement, and he would have gone to trial. 4 16 Andrews's argument failed to persuade the district court. 417 The judge denied
Andrews's motion, explaining that even if Goetz allowed suppression of
Andrews's electronic recordings, the State had still compiled enough evi418
dence for a conviction.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court explained that any defendant
4 19
must show "good cause" in order to withdraw a plea to a criminal charge.
The Court further stated that "a voluntary plea is made in light of the law
applicable at the time the plea is accepted by the court and does not become
vulnerable because of a later judicial decision that changes the law."'420 The
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.

Id.
Andrews, 236 P.3d at 575.
Id.
Id.
Id.
State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 489 (Mont. 2008).
Andrews, 236 P.3d at 576.
Id.
Id. (citing Goetz, 191 P.3d at 489).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Andrews, 236 P.3d at 576.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Court supported this statement by citing Brady v. United States,4 2 1 in which
the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant who admits his or
her guilt in open court is not later allowed to "disown" such an admission
"simply because it later develops that the State would have had a weaker
case than the defendant thought." 4 22 Plea agreements are entered into
"under the law then existing. '4 23 New laws, which broaden the rights a
defendant has waived in a plea agreement, do not make the plea agreement
void.

424

Following this analysis, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of
Andrews's motion to withdraw his plea. 4 25 It found that Andrews knowingly and voluntarily entered into his plea agreement. 42 6 The Court determined that Andrews failed to show the necessary "good cause" for a plea
withdrawal under § 46-16-105(2).427
Three of the seven Montana Supreme Court justices dissented. 428 Jus429
tice Leaphart wrote the first dissent; Justice Cotter joined his opinion.
Justice Leaphart explained that Andrews demonstrated "good cause" to
withdraw his plea because the Goetz decision supplied both a "reason for
withdrawing his guilty plea that did not exist when he pleaded guilty" and
an "intervening circumstance. '4 30 Further, he said the district court used an
improper standard of review when it looked at whether the defendant would
have been convicted without the potentially excludable evidence, instead of
at "whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have
pleaded guilty or insisted on going to trial" as a result of the Goetz decision. 4 3 ' Justice Leaphart believed that if the electronic recordings had been
excluded in accordance with Goetz, a reasonable person in Andrews's position would not have agreed to an Alford plea. 43 2 Under Justice Leaphart's
analysis, the district court improperly denied Andrew's motion to withdraw
4 33
his Alford plea.
Justice Nelson wrote the second dissenting opinion. 434 He believed
that Andrews was entitled to apply "any new rule of criminal procedure that
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.

Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
Andrews, 236 P.3d at 576 (citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 757).
Id. (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774 (1970)).
Id. (citing U.S. v. Quinlan, 473 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Andrews, 236 P.3d at 577.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 574.
Id.
Id. at 577.
Andrews, 236 P.3d at 578.
Id. at 578-579.
Id. at 579.
Id.
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is announced before his conviction becomes final." 435 Andrews's conviction would not become final until after his sentencing, which had not taken
place when Goetz was decided. 436 Therefore, "evenhanded justice" called
for Goetz to be retroactively applied to Andrews's case. 437 Justice Nelson
43 8
argued that Andrews showed enough "good cause" to withdraw his plea.
Andrews is significant because it further establishes the binding nature
of a plea agreement on a defendant and demonstrates the Montana Supreme
Court's reluctance to retroactively apply new law to past criminal convictions. Criminal defense attorneys and their clients should be aware that plea
agreements are usually one-way doors even before sentencing takes place.
Criminal defendants are rarely allowed to turn back once they have been
adjudged guilty. However, the Court's four-three split on this decision
may encourage future litigation on rescission of plea bargains.
-Hanna Schantz

X.

TALLY BISSELL NEIGHBORS, INC. v. EYRIE
SHOTGUN RANCH, LLC

439

In Tally Bissell Neighbors, Inc. v. Eyrie Shotgun Ranch, LLC, the

Montana Supreme Court held that an "intangible invasion, accompanied by
actual damages," provides an adequate basis for a trespass action. 440 The
Court's ruling is significant because a plaintiff does not have to establish
damages in a traditional trespass action. 44' The Court also held that the
conditions that give rise to a nuisance "may qualify as both a public and
private nuisance" under Montana law, even though the plain language of
442
Montana Code Annotated § 27-30-102 suggests otherwise.
This case arose in 2006, when Robert Hayes transferred 60 acres of
land located in the Tally/Bissell Zoning District to the defendant, Eyrie
Shotgun Ranch ("Ranch"). 443 The Ranch subsequently converted the land
into a private shooting range. 444 Tally Bissell Neighbors, Inc. ("Neighbors"), filed suit against the Ranch, claiming in part that the noises produced by the operation of a shooting range near an elementary school and a
neighborhood subdivision constituted a trespass as well as both a public and
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.

Id.
Id.
Andrews, 236 P.3d at 579.
Id.
Tally Bissell Neighbors, Inc. v. Eyrie Shotgun Ranch, LLC, 228 P.3d 1134 (Mont. 2010).
Id. at 1141.
Id.
Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1137.
Id.
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private nuisance. 445 The Ranch responded to the Neighbor's complaint by
filing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
44 6
be granted.
The district court granted the Ranch's motion to dismiss. 44 7 The district court dismissed the trespass claim by reasoning that "noise cannot constitute a trespass" because "only a person or tangible thing that enters the
property of another can constitute a trespass. ' 44 8 The lower court likewise
dismissed the private nuisance claims by reasoning that the conditions that
gave rise to a public nuisance could not also serve as the basis for a private
44 9
nuisance claim according to the plain language of Montana law.
The district court held that under Montana law, an intrusion of sound
alone does not constitute a trespass because a sound is not a "tangible
thing." 4 50 On appeal, the Neighbors argued that the "modem view supports
an action for trespass based upon intangible intrusions. '4 51 The Neighbors
pointed to various cases from other jurisdictions where intangible entries in
the forms of "noise, light, airborne gases, and electromagnetic fields" had
provided a basis for trespass actions. 452 As the Court noted, however, all of
these other jurisdictions have required a showing of "actual physical dam45 3
age" for trespass actions predicated on the entry of intangible things.
The Court accepted the Neighbors' argument and held that "an intangible invasion, accompanied by actual damages, [will] support a cause of action for trespass." 45 4 According to the Court, requiring actual damages for
intangible trespasses provides an important distinction from tangible trespass claims, which do not require a party to prove actual harm or damages. 4 55 The Court explained that this additional requirement was necessary to "maintain the distinction between trespass and nuisance." 456 The
Court opined that this distinction exists because a "party's right to exclusive
possession" of property, as protected by trespass law, is not infringed by an
intangible invasion unless it is accompanied by actual damages. 45 7 If actual
445. Tally Bissell Neighbors, Inc., 228 P.3d at 1137.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 1138.
449. Id. at 1137.
450. Id. at 1141. The Court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965) definition of
trespass in Ducham v. Tuma, 877 P.2d 1002 (Mont. 1986). In Ducham, the Court held that individuals
commit the tort of trespass when they intentionally enter "land in the possession of [another]" or when
they intentionally cause a "thing to do so." Ducham, 877 P.2d at 1005.
451. Tally Bissell Neighbors, Inc., 228 P.3d at 1141.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Tally Bissell Neighbors, Inc., 228 P.3d at 1141.
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damages cannot be shown, then a nuisance action provides a more appropri4 58
ate legal strategy.
Although Tally Bissell Neighbors might appear to alter the definition
for trespass adopted in Ducham, the Court merely provided clarity to the
traditional definition of trespass. Individuals continue to commit trespasses
when they intentionally cause "things" to enter the property of others; the
Court in Tally Bissell Neighbors explained that "things" include both tangible and intangible things. The important distinction that Tally Bissell
Neighbors presents is the additional requirement that plaintiffs must show
actual damages in order for intangible trespass claims to survive summary
judgment. Even though the ruling places an additional burden on plaintiffs,
it provides plaintiffs with a cause of action that was not recognized under
4 59
traditional trespass law.
Montana Code Annotated § 27-30-102 defines a private nuisance by
reference to its definition of public nuisance. A public nuisance is defined
as "one which affects, at the same time, an entire community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons. '460 A private nuisance, by
contrast, is defined as "every nuisance not included in the definition of [a
public nuisance.]" ' 46 1 In Tally Bissell Neighbors, the district court concluded that under this statutory language, the noise from the Ranch's shooting range could not constitute both a public nuisance and a private nuisance,
as the Neighbors had pled. 462 Furthermore, the district court reasoned that
because the condition that gave rise to the private nuisance claims was not
unique to the individual plaintiffs, but was instead a "condition common to
all the plaintiffs," public nuisance was the proper claim; therefore, the dis463
trict court dismissed the private nuisance claim.
The Court began its analysis of the nuisance claims by noting that
§ 27-30-102 was adopted "verbatim from California Civil Code § 3480."
The Court further noted that it "follows the construction placed on the statute by the highest court of the state that first enacted the statute. '' 4 64 Accordingly, the Court adopted the ruling of the California Court of Appeals
in Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Assn. v. County of Orange4 65 that a
"nuisance may be both public and private. 4 6 6
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-30-102(1) (2009).
461. Id. at § 27-30-102(2).
462. Tally Bissell Neighbors, Inc., 228 P.3d at 1140.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Koll-Irvine Cr.Prop. Owners Assn. v. Co. of Orange, 24 Cal. App. 4th 1036 (Cal. App. 1994).
466. Tally Bissell Neighbors, Inc., 228 P.3d at 1140 (citing Koll-Irvine, Cal. App. 4th at 1041).
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The Court indicated that the district court erred in focusing solely on
the condition that gave rise to the public nuisance claim when the district
court should have focused on the injuries suffered by the specific plaintiffs
and whether the "alleged nuisance interfere[d] with a specific plaintiff's use
and enjoyment of his land. '4 67 The Koll-Irvine court's conclusion, subsequently adopted by the Montana Supreme Court, was that in order to proceed on a private nuisance claim based on a non-unique condition, the
plaintiff must show an "injury specific to the use and enjoyment of his or
her land."' 468 The Montana Supreme Court also noted that the injury suffered by a specific plaintiff does not have to be "'different in kind' . . . from
4 69
that suffered by the general public."
Tally Bissell Neighbors provides important guidance to the overlapping spheres of public and private nuisance. Although the language of
§ 27-30-102 seemingly indicates that public and private nuisances are mutually exclusive, Tally Bissell Neighbors holds otherwise. Because the injuries suffered by individual plaintiffs as a result of a single public nuisance
may vary in degree and kind, it is important to allow plaintiffs a means of
recovery that is as unique as their injuries. In terms of protecting plaintiffs'
property rights, the Court's focus on the individual injury-as opposed to
the general condition that gave rise to these individual injuries-appears to
be appropriate and fair.
Tally Bissell Neighbors offers several ways for practitioners to further
develop this area of property law. First, although the Court reasoned that
requiring actual damages in an intangible invasion "maintains the distinction between trespass and nuisance," the Court did not indicate what kind of
damages rise to the level of "actual damages." 470 Furthermore, while the
Court stated that other jurisdictions have required "actual physical damage[s]," it did not provide any explicit guidance on what injuries will meet
this standard in Montana. Instead, the Court merely required that "actual
47 1
damages" be present.
Furthermore, the Court stated that its policy is to follow "the construction placed on the statute by the highest court of the state that first enacted
the statute. '4 72 The Court based its interpretation of § 27-30-102 on the
California Court of Appeals' interpretation of the same language. 473 The
highest court in the State of California, however, is the California Supreme
Court. Practitioners could argue that following the California Court of Ap467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.

Id. (citing Koll-Irvine, Cal. App. 4th at 1041).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Tally Bissell Neighbors, Inc., 228 P.3d at 1141.
Id. at 1140.
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peals' interpretation of § 27-30-102 runs contrary to Montana's stated policies and that the Montana Supreme Court should offer its own interpretation of the statute.
Tally Bissell Neighbors is important because it provides flexibility to
the traditional theories of trespass and nuisance. By doing so, the Court
injected modern sensibilities into two cornerstones of the legal system.
Furthermore, the ruling provides practitioners attempting to settle property
disputes with additional options and strategies. Tally Bissell Neighbors indicates that property law is not static, but that it continues to evolve to
reflect the concerns of modem society.
-John Semmens
XI.

STATE V. ALLEN

474

In State v. Allen, the Montana Supreme Court held that a party to a
telephone conversation has a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy under the Montana Constitution. 475 With this decision, the Court expanded the individual right to privacy and the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Additionally, the Court overruled prior cases
and reinforced its analysis for searches under the Montana Constitution.
The State alleged that on the evening of January 27, 2008, the defendant Brian Hayden Allen and Kristin Golie confronted Louis Escobedo regarding a debt Escobedo owed to Allen. 476 When Escobedo informed Allen
that he did not have the money he owed him, Allen struck Escobedo several
times in the head with a pistol.4 77 The State charged Allen with five felo478
nies as a result of the incident.
Unbeknownst to Allen, Golie worked for the local drug task force as a
confidential informant. 479 As an informant, Golie recorded several of her
telephone conversations with Allen to aid in the criminal investigation of
him.480 During one of these conversations, Allen made incriminating statements regarding the assault on Escobedo. 48' Law enforcement did not obtain a search warrant to record the call. 482
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.

State v. Allen, 241 P.3d 1045 (Mont. 2010).
Id. at 1061.
Id.at 1048.
Id. at 1048-1049.
Id. at 1048.
Id.
Allen, 241 P.3d at 1049.
Id. at 1051.
Id. at 1049.
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Before trial, Allen moved to suppress the recording of the telephone
conversation with Golie. 48 3 He argued that because law enforcement obtained the recording without a warrant, it violated his right to privacy and
his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under Article
II, §§ 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution. 4 84 The district court denied
485 It
Allen's motion and allowed the State to present the recording at trial.
concluded no search occurred because society is unwilling to accept an expectation of privacy in telephone conversations as reasonable. 48 6 The district court determined that although Allen exhibited a subjective expectation
of privacy in his call with Golie, such an expectation is unreasonable because a party to a telephone call can never be sure who is listening on the
48 7
other end.
In its closing rebuttal, the prosecution relied heavily on the recording
of the incriminating statements Allen made to Golie over the phone. 4 88 The
jury convicted Allen of three felonies and the district court sentenced him to
30 years in prison. 4 89 He appealed, arguing that the district court's denial
of the motion to suppress the recorded telephone conversation was in error.

4 90

On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court's
denial of Allen's motion to suppress. 49 1 The Court held that Allen had a
subjective expectation of privacy in his telephone conversations with Golie
and that society was willing to accept that expectation as reasonable. 492 As
49 3
such, the recording constituted a search under the Montana Constitution.
Because the search took place without a warrant, the Court concluded it
violated Allen's right to privacy under Article II, § 10 and right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures under § 11.494
4 95
With its holding, the Court expressly overruled State v. Coleman,
which permitted "warrantless participant recordings" of telephone conversations. 4 96 The Court exposed the analytical shortcomings of both Coleman
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1049.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 1051.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 1053.
491. Id. at 1048.
492. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1061.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Id. at 1060.
496. Id. at 1053 (citing State v. Coleman, 616 P.2d 1090 (Mont. 1980)). The Court defined "'warrantless participant recording" as the "'warrantless electronic monitoring and recording of telephone con. ." Id.
versations by law enforcement with the consent of one party
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and the precedent on which it rested. The Coleman Court had relied on
State v. Hanley to conclude that warrantless participant recordings by telephone did not violate the Montana Constitution. 497 However, in Hanley,
the Court relied on United States Supreme Court decisions and a federal
statute as controlling authority 4 98 and declined to address the issue under
the Montana Constitution. 4 99 Coleman essentially adopted a standard indistinguishable from the federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. 5°° Consequently, the Allen decision marked the
first time the Court addressed warrantless participant recordings of telephone conversations under the additional protections of §§ 10 and 11 of the
50 1
Montana Constitution.
The Court distinguished Coleman and its progeny by examining the
standard enunciated in State v. Goetz. 50 2 Under Goetz, the Court analyzed
the constitutionality of a search under the Montana Constitution using a
three part test. 50 3 The Court considered: "(1) whether the person challenging the state's action has an actual subjective expectation of privacy; (2)
whether society is willing to recognize that subjective expectation as objectively reasonable; and (3) the nature of the state's intrusion. '50 4 In evaluating each of these factors in Allen, the Court reinforced the current constitutional analysis of searches.
The Court agreed with the district court that Allen exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in his telephone calls with Golie. 50 5 The Court
defined a subjective expectation of privacy as "an individual's desire to
keep some aspect of his or her life secure from the perception of the general
public." 50 6 Allen testified that he was unaware his conversations with Golie
were being recorded.50 7 In addition, whenever Allen overheard a voice in
the background on Golie's end, he limited his speech to "innocuous platitudes, conveying no information about the topics that he and Golie were
discussing.' 50 8 The Court concluded that Allen strove to keep his conversa497. Coleman, 616 P.2d at 1093 (citing State v. Hanley, 608 P.2d 104 (Mont. 1980)).
498. Hanley, 608 P.2d at 109-110 (citing U.S. v.White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) and Lopez v. U.S., 373
U.S. 427 (1963)).
499. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1055.
500. Id. at 1056 (citing Coleman, 616 P.2d at 1096).
501. Id.
502. Id. at 1057 (citing State v.Goetz, 191 P.3d 489 (Mont. 2008)). Goetz involved a warrantless
participant recording of a face-to-face conversation.
503. Id.
504. Goetz, 191 P.3d at 497-498. The Goetz test is similar to the Katz test enunciated in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). However, the Goetz test extended the Katz test by adding the
element of the nature of the State's intrusion.
505. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1058.
506. Id. at 1057 (citing Goetz, 191 P.3d at 498).
507. Id.
508. Id. at 1058.
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tions with Golie private, thereby evincing his subjective expectation of pri50 9

vacy.

In determining that society is willing to accept Allen's subjective expectation of privacy as reasonable, the Court relied heavily on the delegate
debates of the 1972 Constitutional Convention. 510 After analyzing the history of the Constitutional Convention, the Court concluded: "[T]he delegates would not have countenanced warrantless monitoring of private telephone conversations at the time they drafted Montana's constitution. We
are convinced the citizenry of this state would not tolerate such unrestrained
government conduct today." 511 Thus, the Court reversed the district court's
decision and held that society is willing to accept expectations of privacy in
private telephone conversations as reasonable. 512 Because Allen exhibited
a subjective expectation of privacy and society is willing to accept that expectation as reasonable, Golie's recording of her conversation with Allen
51 3
constituted a search under the Montana Constitution.
Finally, the Court addressed the third prong of the Goetz test by examining the nature of the State's intrusion. 514 Under this portion of Goetz, the
Court determines "whether the state action complained of violated Article
II, Section 10 and 11 protections because it was not justified by a compelling state interest or was undertaken without procedural safeguards such as
a properly issued search warrant or other special circumstances. ' 515 Although Golie's recording took place without a warrant, the State argued that
the consent exception to warrantless searches applied because Golie consented to the recordings. 5 16 The Court rejected this argument by relying on
Goetz, where the Court determined that both parties involved in a conversation must have the opportunity to object to the conversation being recorded
without a warrant. 517 Because law enforcement failed to obtain either a
warrant or Allen's consent, the recording of his conversation with Golie
violated Article II, §§ 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution. 518
Justice Nelson wrote a detailed concurrence in which he argued that
the plain meaning of "search" should supplant the Katz/Goetz test. 519 He
509. Id.
510. Id.at 1058-1059.
511. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1060.
512. Id.
513. Id. at 1061.
514. Id.
515. Goetz, 191 P.3d at 498.
516. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1061.
517. Id. (citing Goetz, 191 P.3d at 501-502).
518. Id.
519. Id. at 1062, 1064 (Nelson, J. concurring).
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asserted that the Katz test is a "'self-indulgent test"' 520 where "the privacy
expectations that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable ultimately
turn out to be the privacy expectations that a majority of the members of
this Court decide are reasonable." 52 1 He opined that the Court is not qualified to make such a decision absent a factual record indicating society's
views. 522 In addition, Justice Nelson argued that not only the recordings of
Golie's and Allen's telephone conversations should be suppressed, but so
should Golie's testimony regarding the conversations. 523 However, the majority refuted this argument by determining Golie's testimony was not
524
tainted merely by the fact that the conversations were recorded.
With Allen, the Court extended the rights to privacy and to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures to include telephone conversations
under the Montana Constitution. The Montana practitioner should be aware
that law enforcement must now obtain a warrant to electronically monitor
both face-to-face conversations under Goetz as well as telephone conversations under Allen. It remains to be seen whether warrantless participant
recording of other forms of communication such as email and text message
will violate the Montana Constitution as well. Given the Court's recent
rebuke of police monitoring, it is probable that those forms of surveillance
will also require warrants or warrant exceptions. Regardless, Allen stands
as a strong affirmation of individual privacy rights and protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Montana Constitution.
-John Sullivan
XII.

STATE V. DISTRICT COURT OF THE 18TH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF MONTANA

5 25

In State v. District Court of the 18th Judicial Districtof Montana, the
Montana Supreme Court rejected the procedural application of the Modified
Just Rule 52 6 to Montana Rule of Evidence 404(b). 5 27 The Court overruled
the notice requirement's foundational case law and requested the Montana
520. Id. at 1063 (quoting Minn. v. Carter,525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concur-

ring)).
521. Id.
522. Allen, 241 P.3d at 1063 (Nelson, J. concurring).
523. Id. at 1062-1063.
524. Id. at 1061 n. 2 (majority).
525. State v. Dist. Ct. of the 18th Jud. Dist. of Mont., 246 P.3d 415 (Mont. 2010).
526. The Modified Just Rule required prosecutors to provide written notice of intention to introduce
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts under Rule 404(b). To satisfy the rule, the notice needed to
identify the evidence to be introduced and specify the purpose of its introduction. State v. Dobson, 30
P.3d 1077, 1083 (Mont. 2001).
527. State v. Dist. Ct. of the 18th Jud. Dist., 246 P.3d at 417.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2011

45

Montana Law Review, Vol. 72 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 7

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72

Legislature repeal its statutory codification. 528 Finally, the Court detailed
529
the proper procedure for compliance with Rule 404(b).
The State of Montana petitioned for a writ of supervisory control in
State v. Anderson,5 30 challenging evidentiary rulings that suppressed evidence in the deliberate homicide trial of Shanara Anderson. 53 1 On the
morning of January 10, 2008, Anderson alerted authorities in Bozeman that
her "three-month-old daughter Vanyel was 'white as a sheet' and not
breathing." 5 32 Medical personnel responded, but the child did not survive. 533 According to Anderson's friend, Anderson said she had placed a
leather jacket over Vanyel's bassinette the night before. 534 Anderson denied using the jacket to cover the bassinette and implied her two-year-old
daughter had. 53 5 A state medical examiner concluded the child's cause of
death was undetermined but noted "the death of an infant can occur without
definitive autopsy findings, such as in smothering or suffocation."5 36 On
February 4, 2009, the State charged Anderson with deliberate homicide,
intending "to prove circumstantially that Anderson purposely or knowingly
'5 37
caused Vanyel's death by suffocating her."
In State v. Just,5 38 the Montana Supreme Court created a notice requirement in Rule 404(b) to ensure its proper application. 539 Under that
rule, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is generally inadmissible to
prove a charged offense, but may be introduced "for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident." 540 The Just Court required the State to
notify defendants if it intended to introduce evidence of similar acts. 54 1 The
Court later expanded Just's procedural protection, eventually requiring the
State's notice to detail why the evidence was admissible 54 2 and articulate
how the "fact of consequence may be inferred." 543 Montana law required
528. Id. at 424, 429.
529. Id. at 428.
530. State v. Anderson at 1 (18th Jud. Dist. Mont. Feb. 4, 2009) (No. DC-09-33AX) (copies of
district court filings are on file with the Montana Law Review).
531. State v. Dist. Ct. of the 18th Jud. Dist., 246 P.3d at 417.
532. Id. at 418.
533. Id. at 417.
534. Id. at 418.
535. Id. at 418-419.
536. Id. at 419.
537. State v. Dist. Ct. of the 18th Jud. Dist., 246 P.3d at 418, 420.
538. State v. Just, 602 P.2d 957 (Mont. 1997).
539. State v. Dist. Ct. of the 18th Jud. Dist., 246 P.3d at 425 (citing Just, 602 P.2d at 963-964).
540. Mont. R. Evid. 404(b).
541. State v. Dist. Ct. of the 18th Jud. Dist., 246 P.3d at 425 (citing Just, 602 P.2d at 963-964).
542. Id. (citing State v. Whitlow, 949 P.2d 239, 246 (Mont. 1997)).
543. Id. (citing Dobson, 30 P.3d at 1083).
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that this notice-absent good cause-be given prior to the omnibus hear544
ing.
Anderson's omnibus hearing took place on May 11, 2009, but the dis54 5
trict court extended the deadline for the Just Notice until May 15, 2009.
On May 15, the prosecutor filed a Just Notice announcing intent to introduce a list of incidents of prior abuse, statements Anderson made about
Vanyel, and other "other acts" evidence. 54 6 The notice concluded that the
evidence was being offered "to show motive, intent, knowledge and lack of
mistake as to the crime of Deliberate Homicide." 54 7 The prosecutor explained he filed the notice to preclude the defendant from claiming surprise
but did not concede that the evidence was subject to the Modified Just
Rule. 548 The prosecutor also argued the evidence was admissible under the
transaction rule, 54 9 though he later abandoned this argument following the
550
Court's decision in State v. Lacey.
Anderson objected to the prosecutor's original Just Notice, arguing
that it was defective because it did not match each specific piece of evidence with a specific theory of admissibility, leaving her to guess at each
item's purpose. 55 I The prosecutor filed an Amended Just Notice containing
greater specificity to address Anderson's "technical objections.."55 2 Anderson moved to strike the Amended Just Notice as untimely for being filed
553
after the omnibus hearing without good cause.
The prosecutor argued that the purpose of the notice requirementpreventing surprise and allowing the defendant sufficient time to properly
respond to allegations of previous conduct-was satisfied. 5 54 The prosecutor maintained that the February 4, 2009 Affidavit of Probable Cause that
supported the Original Leave to File the Information described the majority
of the evidence he intended to introduce and that he had properly filed the
initial Just Notice on May 15, 2009.555 The prosecutor noted that when the
544.
545.
546.
547.

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-13-109 (2009).
State v Dist. Ct. of the 18th Jud. Dist., 246 P.3d at 421.
Id. at 420.
Id.

548. Id.

549. The transaction rule allows introduction of declarations, acts, and omissions normally barred by
Rule 404(b) when they are a part of a transaction which is itself the fact in dispute. Mont. Code Ann.
§ 26-1-103.
550. State v. Dist. Ct. of the 18th Jud. Dist., 246 P.3d at 422 (discussing State v. Lacev, 224 P.3d
1247, 1255 (Mont. 2010), in which the Court held a factual situation with similar connections between
prior "other acts" evidence and a charged criminal act were non-inextricably linked and thus inadmissible under the transaction rule).
551. Id.
552. Id. at 421.
553. Id. at 422.
554. Id. at 421.
555. Id.
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Amended Just Notice was filed on October 30, 2009, the trial date was still
55 6
five and a half months away.
In a March 11, 2009 hearing on the issue, Anderson conceded that she
was aware of the evidence the State would present. 575 However, she argued
that the State must still show good cause to violate the notice deadline lest
prosecutors simply file "skeleton notices" that could later be amended. 558
The district court sided with Anderson, finding the initial Just notice was
"procedurally defective. ' 559 The district court further granted Anderson's
motion to strike the Amended Just Notice, reasoning that the Montana Supreme Court had previously enforced a similar good cause requirement. 560
Finally, the court noted that even if the Amended Just Notice had been
effective, most of the evidence failed to qualify for an exception under Rule
56 1
404(b) and was inadmissible.
The Court granted the State's petition for a writ of supervisory control. 5 62 The Court then attacked its own jurisprudence and acknowledged
that the Modified Just Rule created "needlessly technical notice requirements, created uncertainty and inconsistency in the analysis of alleged character evidence, and led to the wrongful exclusion of evidence in some
cases." 56 3 Writing the unanimous opinion, Justice Nelson noted the evidence in this case was set aside on technical grounds that fell outside the
true scope of Rule 404(b). 564 The Court took issue with the notice requirement, which "created a battle for prosecutors that they should not have to
fight." 5 65 According to the Court, while a defendant is entitled to notice of
what the State plans to introduce, defendants receive such notice through a
566
combination of the required charging documents and discovery requests.
Further, the Court explained that the notice requirement laid a trap for prosecutors, forcing them to anticipate what the defense will claim to be extrinsic and punishing them for guessing wrong. 5 67 "Exclusion on this basis is
568
untenable," the Court said.
Essentially, the Court found that the Modified Just Rule notice requirement was based upon the mistaken idea that Rule 404(b) categorically
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.
567.
568.

State v.Dist. Ct. of the 18th Jud. Dist., 246 P.3d at 422.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 423.
State v. Dist. Ct. of the 18th Jud. Dist., 246 P.3d at 417.
Id. at 424.
Id.
Id. at 425.
Id. at426.
Id.
State v. Dist. Ct. of the 18th Jud. Dist., 246 P.3d at 426.
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barred "other acts" evidence. 5 69 Rather, the Court held that the rule precluded admission of "other acts" evidence under the theory of conformity of
character. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is potentially admissible, but cannot be introduced to show the defendant is a bad actor who is
likely to have acted badly again. 5 70 The Court explained that while defendants could rely upon Rule 404(b) 5 71 to shield them from such improper
inferences, it "did not justify the current procedures under which the prosecution must divine what items of evidence the defense might find objectionable."5 72
Consequently, the Court held the notice requirement to be unnecessary, overruled Just and Matt, and requested that the Montana State Legislature repeal the codification of the rule. 5 73 The Court articulated the new
proper procedure: (1) upon a defendant's request, the prosecution must disclose the witnesses it seeks to call and the evidence it intends to produce;
(2) such disclosure provides sufficient notice of any "other crimes, wrongs,
or acts" evidence; (3) it is the defendant's burden to identify inadmissible
evidence; and (4) the prosecution may argue in response why it believes the
evidence is admissible. 574 The Court noted that evidence deemed admissible may nevertheless be subject to limiting instructions and that prosecutors
could face sanctions under Montana Code Annotated § 46-15-329 for fail575
ing to comply with disclosure requests.
For the Montana practitioner, the Court's ruling eliminates Just notice
requirements and represents a sea change in the evidentiary procedure surrounding Rule 404(b). The Court's clarification significantly alters the limiting nature of the rule, and may allow broader admission of "other acts"
evidence. To remain compliant with this new rule, prosecutors should be
sure to provide detailed, inclusive charging documents and properly respond to discovery requests. Conversely, defense attorneys now bear the
burden of objecting to inadmissible "other crimes, wrongs, acts" evidence
and may no longer wait for the prosecutors to anticipate their objections.
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